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JO N A T H A N M ASUR

Inflation Indicators
In Patent Inflation, I argued that the asymmetry in Federal Circuit review of
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) decisions would lead over time to inflation in
the boundaries defining what inventions are patentable. In short essays, Professor Arti
Rai and Lisa Ouellette have offered valuable commentary, including both qualitative
(Rai) and quantitative (Ouellette) evidence bearing on the question of inflation. In
this brief response, I explain how their evidence is consistent with—indeed, bolsters—
the theory presented in Patent Inflation. Direct Federal Circuit reversals of PTO
decisions make up only a small portion of that court’s caseload. But those cases have
exerted outsized influence on the development of the law, particularly across a number
of the most significant patent doctrines. This is just as Patent Inflation would predict.
introduction
Professor Arti Rai1 and Lisa Ouellette2 have written interesting and
provocative responses to my article, Patent Inflation,3 and I thank them for their
valuable contributions to this discussion. Their essays add useful empirical
context—qualitative, in Rai’s case, and quantitative, in Ouellette’s—to the
theory I presented. In light of that theory, their empirical findings are not
entirely surprising. What is surprising is that they style their responses as

2.

Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the Federal Circuit?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/12/20/rai.html.
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, What Are the Sources of Patent Inflation? An Analysis of Federal
Circuit Patentability Rulings, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 347 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/
12/27/ouellette.html.

3.

Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011).
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critiques of the theory. To the contrary, all of Rai and Ouellette’s findings are
consistent with, and even supportive of, the theory I offered in Patent Inflation.
i. the pto in institutional context
A. An Antagonistic PTO?
Arti Rai’s important and thoughtful essay is most notable for the ways in
which it supports the theory laid out in Patent Inflation. Rai points out that in
two important areas—patents on software and patents on gene sequences—
expansion in the law has been driven by Federal Circuit reversals of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).4 That is, the PTO had denied patents on
what were then boundary-pushing software and genetic inventions—
inventions that would not have been patentable under governing Federal
Circuit law. The Federal Circuit then reversed these denials, granting the
patents and inflating the boundaries governing what sorts of inventions might
be patented. This is precisely in line with what Patent Inflation argued would
take place: the PTO would feed the Federal Circuit a steady diet of boundarypushing patent denials, and the Federal Circuit would eventually grant one of
those patents, inflating the law governing patentability.5
So far so good. But Rai goes on to argue that the PTO repeatedly rejected
software and genetic patents that were later approved by the Federal Circuit.6
In genetics, In re Bell7 in 1993 was followed by In re Deuel8 in 1995; in software,
In re Iwahashi9 in 1989 was followed by In re Alappat10 in 1994. Rai reads these
repeated challenges to Federal Circuit authority as an indication that some
other consideration—possibly a concern for examiner workloads—had
trumped the agency’s desire to avoid the harm to its reputation that
accompanies reversals by the Federal Circuit.11
Rai is correct that repeated, ongoing challenges of Federal Circuit law, and
an apparent willingness to accept significant numbers of reversals over a long
period of time, would contradict the model set forth in Patent Inflation of a

4.

Rai, supra note 1, at 338-39.

5.

Masur, supra note 3, at 502-12.
Rai, supra note 1, at 338-39.
991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Rai, supra note 1, at 337.
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PTO eager to avoid appeals and reversals. But Patent Inflation never meant to
imply that the PTO would be reversed at most once on any given issue. As that
article explains, inflation will be “slow and stochastic”12—it moves randomly,
and in “fits and starts.”13 Moreover, the PTO is a mammoth organization,
employing thousands of examiners and adjudicating hundreds of thousands of
patents per year. It cannot be expected to adjust instantly and precisely after a
single Federal Circuit case. Like any organization of its size, the PTO will make
random errors and arrive at occasionally inconsistent results through the
vagaries of its examiners and the judges of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences. Indeed, it is this potential for error that forces the PTO to set its
cutpoint to the right of the Federal Circuit in the first instance. If the PTO were
perfectly accurate and perfectly responsive, it could simply adapt instantly to
whatever cutpoint the Federal Circuit has set and have no reason to fear
reversal. But, of course, few agencies are able to meet such a standard.
In this respect, Rai has simply set a bar that is too high—higher than can be
expected from any natural set of legal processes, and higher than Patent
Inflation meant to set for itself. A pattern of dozens of reversals of the PTO over
the course of several years might indicate that the agency has chosen to face off
against the court; two isolated cases do not. The examples Rai cites are entirely
consistent with the idea of a massive agency turning steadily toward a court’s
set of rules, with occasional errors and misadventures along the way. And Rai
herself admits that in each case the PTO “capitulated without even attempting
to appeal the Federal Circuit reversal to the Supreme Court.”14
This point is made even more clear by examining the patents that the PTO
did grant around the time of Deuel, Bell, Iwahashi, and Alappat. If Rai is correct,
the PTO should not have been granting other gene patents before Bell or other
software patents before Alappat. Her argument, after all, is that the PTO did
not get the hint in Deuel and Iwahashi, forcing the Federal Circuit to reverse
once more (in each field) before the PTO acquiesced and began granting gene
and software patents. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. Prior to
Bell—and in some cases, prior to Deuel as well—the PTO was granting gene
patents in significant numbers.15 And prior to Alappat, not to mention

12.

Masur, supra note 3, at 512.

13.

Id. at 517 n.178.
Rai, supra note 1, at 337.
See, e.g., DNA Segment Containing Streptomycin Resistance Gene and Being Capable of
Controlling Expression of Said Gene, U.S. Patent No. 5,202,427 (filed Feb. 25, 1991) (issued
Apr. 13, 1993); 60-Amino-Acid Polypeptide, U.S. Patent No. 5,202,417 (filed Aug. 21, 1989)
(issued Apr. 13, 1993); Human Preproinsulin-Like Growth Factor I, U.S. Patent No.
5,070,075 (filed Mar. 15, 1990) (issued Dec. 13, 1991).

14.
15.
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Iwahashi, the agency was granting substantial numbers of software patents as
well.16 The agency did not need these second reversals to prod it toward
accepting patents on genetics and software; it had already moved quite a
distance in that direction. Bell and Alappat are thus not evidence of the PTO’s
intransigence, bu t of the inherent randomness of a process that spreads
hundreds of thousands of patents across thousands of examiners. The same is
very likely true with respect to the cases involving the “teaching, suggestion, or
motivation” test for obviousness that Rai mentions.17 Rai’s analysis, like the
rest of her work in patent law, is perceptive, incisive, and thorough. It is also
entirely consistent with the theory enunciated in Patent Inflation.
B. Outside Forces
In the second and third parts of her essay, Rai describes the PTO’s
interactions with a variety of institutions other than the Federal Circuit—the
Supreme Court, other agencies within the executive branch, and some private
parties—and the impact those institutions have had on the PTO. As before, Rai
is insightful and thorough. And as before, her findings are entirely consistent
with the theory described in Patent Inflation.
First, Rai notes that the PTO has joined the Solicitor General in briefing
fifteen cases before the Supreme Court since 1996. In nine of those cases, the
PTO took a position opposed to the Federal Circuit.18 This is an interesting
observation, but it in no way contradicts the theory behind Patent Inflation.
Unlike typical appeals of denied patents, the PTO has nothing to lose from
these types of cases. The additional expense to the agency is minimal, and PTO
administrators’ reputations will not suffer if the agency does not prevail—and,

16.

17.

18.
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See, e.g., Method and Apparatus for Mapping Surface Texture, U.S. Patent No. 5,333,245
(filed Dec. 10, 1993) (issued July 26, 1994); Virtual Storage Data Processor with Enhanced
Dispatching Priority Allocation of CPU Resources, U.S. Patent No. 5,333,319 (filed Mar. 2,
1992) (issued July 26, 1994); Filter System Having an Adaptive Control for Updating Filter
Samples, U.S. Patent No. 5,053,983 (filed Apr. 4, 1986) (issued Oct. 1, 1991).
See Rai, supra note 1, at 340 n.25 (citing In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir.
2002); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001); and In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994,
1000-01 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). However, this is substantially more difficult to demonstrate.
Doing so would require scrutinizing the correspondence between the patentee and the
patent’s examiner. Those documents are publicly available, but they are not electronically
searchable. Nor should the larger number of these cases be taken as an indication of greater
PTO resistance. Obviousness is an issue in nearly every patent application, so it stands to
reason that more appeals would raise issues of obviousness than questions related to the
patentability of software.
Rai, supra note 1, at 341.
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as Rai points out, the PTO rarely loses when it joins the Solicitor General.19
Importantly, Patent Inflation does not claim that the PTO has any particular,
systematic interest in a more or less expansive patent law. To the contrary, it is
the agency’s general disinterest in the substantive content of the law that
contributes to its behavior. The PTO’s objective is to be certain that its
application of the law is at least as permissive as the Federal Circuit’s—
whatever the Federal Circuit’s view of the law might be. This is why Patent
Inflation argued that “[e]ven an aggressive Supreme Court cannot staunch the
flow of improperly granted patents from the PTO.”20 No matter where the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court set the patentability boundaries, the
PTO will always have an incentive to grant excessive numbers of patents, many
of which will be invalid under governing law.
Why, then, does the PTO bother with patent cases that reach the Supreme
Court? The agency might have some other institutional interest that it can only
achieve through that case, such as a reduction in workload. Or, more likely,
officials at the PTO might believe that they have little to lose and much to gain
reputationally from winning a case before the Supreme Court. Either way, the
PTO’s behavior in a small number of Supreme Court cases says little about its
treatment of the thousands of patents it examines. The agency’s incentives in
the two situations are widely divergent.
Next, Rai points to the PTO’s heightened utility guidelines, which were
spurred by pressure from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as another
example of the agency’s willingness to defy the Federal Circuit.21 I discussed
this example briefly in Patent Inflation,22 prompted by a generous suggestion
from Rai herself.23 Rai is absolutely right that outside pressure—pressure from
an institution other than the Federal Circuit—can cause the PTO to hew to an
interpretation of patent law more restrictive than the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation. Under the theory of Patent Inflation, this is entirely to be
expected. The general point is that the same reputational concerns that would
drive PTO administrators to avoid reversals would also compel them to adopt a
more restrictive stance against some type of patents, if they thought it would
serve their interests. If officials at the NIH—presumably with the backing of

19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

Id.
Masur, supra note 3, at 520. Lisa Ouellette discounts this point, arguing that it
“underappreciates the role of the Supreme Court in resetting the boundaries of
patentability.” Ouellette, supra note 2, at 347. But her argument overlooks the fact that the
PTO will not police these boundaries faithfully.
Rai, supra note 1, at 343-44.
Masur, supra note 3, at 521.
Id. at 521 n.194.
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the White House—are pressuring the PTO, it is not at all surprising that the
PTO would respond by heightening its utility standards. As Rai suggests, this
type of outside pressure may serve as an important mechanism for correcting
or ameliorating the Federal Circuit and PTO’s natural inflationary tendencies.
The same is true for the PTO’s treatment of information technology (IT)
patents, Rai’s final example.24 There, the PTO received a substantial number of
complaints over a period of years from IT companies regarding the poor
quality of granted patents. The agency’s response was to announce that it
would henceforth reject any claim that was “amenable to two or more plausible
claim constructions,” a more restrictive reading of the definiteness doctrine
than the Federal Circuit has ever adopted.25 Here, too, the PTO’s response was
predictable. As Patent Inflation noted, in recent years the agency has cultivated
private firms as allies in its quest for additional funding.26 These efforts have
paid off, as the joint lobbying efforts of the PTO and its private allies managed
for several years to convince Congress to refrain from diverting PTO fees for
other purposes.27 It is thus unsurprising that repeated complaints from some of
the PTO’s important “customers” (as it refers to them28) would prompt the
agency to adopt a more restrictive stance against what these firms believed
were bad patents. That being said, it is hard to take the PTO’s “two or more
plausible claim constructions” rule too seriously. Even a quick survey of recent
patents reveals that the agency is still granting significant numbers of patents
with highly ambiguous claim language, despite its protestations to the
contrary.29 Here, the PTO may be playing both sides: offering cheap talk to
satisfy IT firms while continuing to grant excessive numbers of patents in
order to avoid the ire of the Federal Circuit.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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Rai, supra note 1, at 344-45.
Ex parte Miyazaki, No. 2007-3300, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1212 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19,
2008).
Masur, supra note 3, at 498 n.114; see Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in
Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1984-88 (2009).
See Long, supra note 26, at 1987-88; Masur, supra note 3, at 498 & n.114.
Long, supra note 26, at 1985.
See, e.g., Prism Techs., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 8:10CV220, 2011 WL 5911230, at *1, *3
(D. Neb. Nov. 28, 2011) (hinging on multiple potential meanings of the term “hardware
key”); Ewinwin, Inc. v. Groupon, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2678-T-24, 2011 WL 5877037, at *3, *6
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2011) (involving multiple possible meanings of the phrase “volume
pricing”); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., No. 11-11681-NMG, 2011 WL
5114475, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 28, 2011) (“Th[e] alleged infringement . . . depends on how
broadly the claim term ‘separation method’ is construed.”).
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ii. quantitative measures of f ederal circuit reversals
A. The Relevance of Case and Citation Counts
Lisa Ouellette makes two principal points in her valuable and technically
impressive response. First, she argues that very few of the patent cases decided
by the Federal Circuit are reversals of PTO decisions. Second, she claims that
the Federal Circuit reversals that do exist are no more influential—or perhaps
even less influential—than the typical patent case. On the basis of these points,
Ouellette concludes that Federal Circuit reversals cannot possibly exert the
influence on patent law that I ascribe to them.30 Yet Ouellette’s first point is
precisely what the theory in Patent Inflation would predict; her second point is
directly contradicted both by her own data and by Rai’s findings; and neither
point supports the conclusion she draws.
Ouellette examined all published Federal Circuit decisions dealing with
patentability from the years 1990, 2000, and 2008-2010.31 She found 324 cases
dealing with patentability during those years, of which twenty-five were
Federal Circuit reversals of direct appeals from the PTO or the equivalent.32
Ouellette treats this number as if it were surprisingly small, but Patent Inflation
predicts exactly this type of result. Because the vast majority of direct appeals
from the PTO involve boundary-pushing patents, the Federal Circuit will
rarely reverse the PTO’s judgment. That is precisely the reason for the PTO’s
behavior in the first place—a desire to avoid reversals and appeals. As I
explained in Patent Inflation, “the Federal Circuit has reversed the PTO in only
11.8% of cases since 1997, and approximately 15% of cases since it was created
in 1982, compared with a general rate of reversal across all civil cases of
approximately 20%.”33 If direct appeals from the PTO only represent a fraction
of all cases heard by the Federal Circuit (because the PTO is trying to avoid
denying any patents that would be worth appealing) and if the Federal Circuit

30.
31.

32.
33.

Ouellette, supra note 2, at 348.
The years 2008-2010 were presumably chosen because they are recent. Ouellette states that
“[c]ases from 1990 and 2000 were added to the initial dataset of 2008-2010 to confirm that
these findings are not a recent trend” but does not explain why she chose those years in
particular except to argue that “the specific years chosen to test [Masur’s] theory should not
matter.” Id. at 356 n.46. This is not entirely true; Ouellette risks missing important trends
and cases by focusing on only a few years. (This may well have occurred; see infra text
accompanying notes 35-41.) Because inflation is stochastic, it cannot be expected to proceed
at uniform speed in every conceivable time period.
Id. at 364 tbl.3.
Masur, supra note 3, at 507 (footnotes omitted).
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only overturns those appeals 12% to 15% of the time (because the appeals that
are taken are unlikely to succeed), then there are bound to be relatively few
Federal Circuit reversals. It would have been disquieting for the theory in
Patent Inflation if Ouellette had instead found significant numbers of appeals and
reversals from the PTO, as that theory predicts that the PTO has structured its
processes to avoid such cases. But Ouellette found nothing of the sort. It is
possible that Ouellette appreciates this fact, though it is difficult to be certain.34
The real question is what impact those reversals have had. Ouellette
explores this question both qualitatively and quantitatively, by scrutinizing the
reversals directly and by counting the number of times they have been cited.
Finding that these cases do not appear to have been cited frequently, Ouellette
concludes that “these twenty-five cases represented at most minor shifts in
patentability doctrine.”35 That may be true for the few years that Ouellette
examined. But it is not true generally, as both Ouellette’s and Rai’s work
demonstrate. First, Ouellette notes almost in passing that “out of over seventy
Federal Circuit cases cited in the patentability section of a leading intellectual
property casebook, only ten were reversals of PTO patent rejections.”36
Ouellette treats a citation in this textbook as a rough proxy for whether a case
was significant. But she neglects to mention that this means that 13.3% of those
significant cases are Federal Circuit reversals of the PTO, compared with 7.7%
of the cases in Ouellette’s general sample.37 That is to say, Federal Circuit
reversals are represented in the casebook at nearly twice the rate as they appear
in Ouellette’s sample. Thus, according to the authors of this “leading
intellectual property casebook,” they are nearly twice as likely to be significant
as the typical case. Ouellette does not consider this fact.
Second, Rai’s response is devoted to arguing precisely the opposite of what
Ouellette claimed to find: Rai explains that Federal Circuit reversals of the
PTO are driving the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on patentability. In
particular, explains Rai, Federal Circuit reversals of the PTO are responsible for
the patentability rules surrounding software programs and gene sequences.38
This is just as Patent Inflation predicts. (Rai takes this as separate evidence that
the theory behind Patent Inflation is flawed, but that conclusion is unwarranted
for the reasons stated above.) Their disagreement is even more stark when it

34.

Ouellette, supra note 2, at 364 (“Masur might argue that these cases should be rare . . . .”).

35.

Id.
Id. at 354 & n.38 (citing ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 128-250 (rev. 4th ed. 2007)).
The calculation is: 10/75 = 13.3%; 25/324 = 7.7%.
See Rai, supra note 1, at 338-39.

36.
37.
38.
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comes to the Federal Circuit’s relaxation of the nonobviousness requirement.
Ouellette devotes a paragraph to arguing that few of the important Federal
Circuit nonobviousness cases are direct reversals of the PTO;39 Rai spends a
paragraph highlighting the important cases in which the Federal Circuit
reversed PTO findings of obviousness.40
Rai and Ouellette cannot both be correct. Yet Ouellette’s primary measures
of case importance—citation counts and mentions in treatises and casebooks—
are only proxies for doctrinal importance. Moreover, Ouellette’s quantitative
analysis concerned only a few years of Federal Circuit jurisprudence, rather
than the full scope of that Circuit’s law on any issue. Rai’s analysis, on the
other hand, is based upon examination of full lines of doctrine and the cases
that played crucial roles in the development of those doctrines. Accordingly,
nothing in Ouellette’s study refutes the conclusions that Rai reaches.41 This is
one of the signature limitations of Ouellette’s statistical approach: it says little
about actual substantive changes in patent doctrine and nothing beyond the
few years she tabulated.
Lastly, and most importantly, Ouellette’s “empirical test” entirely
misunderstands the argument presented in Patent Inflation regarding the roles
of PTO reversals, PTO affirmances, and infringement cases. Patent Inflation
argued that neither Federal Circuit affirmances of the PTO nor district court
appeals in litigation will have any significant net effect on the direction of patent
law.42 When the Federal Circuit affirms the PTO, it will almost always do so on
the basis of existing law, leaving that law in place. Appeals in litigation, for
their part, will present symmetric opportunities for inflation and deflation of
the law, producing no net legal change in expectation.43 Movement in the law,
if it occurs, will come from Federal Circuit reversals of PTO decisions, the vast
majority of which will concern boundary-pushing patents. Thus, Patent

39.
40.
41.

42.
43.

Ouellette, supra note 2, at 355.
Rai, supra note 1, at 340.
Similarly, Ouellette criticizes the case study presented in Patent Inflation because the
business method cases cited are not reversals of PTO denials, see Ouellette, supra note 2, at
352-53, without mentioning that the earlier software cases cited—see Masur, supra note 3, at
524 n.208 (citing In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995); and In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc))—were both Federal Circuit reversals of the PTO.
Masur, supra note 3, at 513-17.
Ouellette describes this as an “assumption,” see Ouellette, supra note 2, at 370, but it is not—
there is a theoretical explanation for the point. In the same sentence, Ouellette also claims
that Patent Inflation “assum[ed] that patentability can be collapsed to a single dimension
with a single boundary.” Id. In fact, Patent Inflation argued precisely the opposite: there are
“many different dimensions to patentability,” and the theory “is entirely generalizable to any
number of dimensions.” Masur, supra note 3, at 484-85.
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Inflation predicts that the Federal Circuit could decide numerous PTO
affirmances and litigation appeals without producing any net directional legal
impact. For Ouellette to point out that many such cases exist is to completely
miss the point. What matters is which subset of cases will generate any net
deflation or inflation in the law: PTO reversals, as Patent Inflation predicts, or
PTO affirmances and litigation appeals as well. None of Ouellette’s findings
offer any purchase on this question.
Ouellette’s comments regarding the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA), the predecessor to the Federal Circuit, involve a similar
misunderstanding of the mechanisms behind patent inflation. Ouellette
describes as “odd” the idea that “patent inflation increased dramatically when
stewardship over patent appeals passed from the CCPA to the Federal
Circuit.”44 Contrary to what Ouellette implies, Patent Inflation claimed no such
“dramatic increase”—those words are Ouellette’s. But if other scholars are
correct in describing the ongoing expansion in patentability as primarily a
Federal Circuit phenomenon,45 there is a simple structural explanation, one
that Patent Inflation explained and that Ouellette apparently missed. While the
Federal Circuit hears cases in panels, the CCPA took cases only en banc.46 At
the CCPA, then, “[t]here was no opportunity for a favorable panel to issue a
boundary-stretching decision.”47 Because the CCPA heard cases only en banc,
the law of that court remained tethered to the median judge. Panel
heterogeneity is one of the key drivers of patent inflation.48 Without it,
inflation should occur much more slowly, if at all.
One final note is in order. Patent Inflation contained a falsifiable prediction:
there will be greater inflation with respect to the legal doctrines that determine
patentability—patentable subject matter, obviousness, and the like—than with
respect to legal doctrines that arise only in the course of suits for infringement,
such as inequitable conduct and willful infringement.49 The reason is that the
former are subject to institutional inflation because of the asymmetry in
appeals from the PTO to the Federal Circuit, while the latter are not. If this
prediction proves to be untrue, then the theory of patent inflation is likely
flawed. Ouellette could have chosen to test this prediction. Instead, she elected

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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Ouellette, supra note 2, at 353 (emphasis in original).
See Ouellette, supra note 2, at 353 n.35.
Masur, supra note 3, at 510 n.163.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 517.
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to perform a separate test, one that supports the theory that Patent Inflation
proposed.
In sum, Ouellette’s argument that PTO reversals did not significantly shift
the boundaries of patentability is almost certainly incorrect, as the previous
paragraphs demonstrate. But even if it were true, it would hardly constitute a
refutation of Patent Inflation. The theory in that article was founded upon the
differential impact of various types of cases upon the law. Ouellette’s empirical
research, interesting and impressive though it is, sheds little light on those
issues.
B. Litigation-Driven Inflation
Having (mistakenly) dismissed the asymmetry in appeals from the PTO as
the source of inflation in the patent law, Ouellette proposes a closely related
alternative. She suggests that inflation in the rules governing patentability may
be occurring because of an asymmetry in appeals of infringement cases. Patent
Inflation observed that the patents that eventually reach the Federal Circuit are
likely clustered symmetrically around the circuit’s cutpoint; the Federal Circuit
votes to uphold the validity of 52% of the patents it adjudicates.50 However,
Ouellette notes that patents that have been granted by the PTO carry a
presumption of validity. In practice, this means that in litigation a party must
demonstrate that the patent is invalid by “clear and convincing evidence.”
Ouellette thus argues that the patents reaching the Federal Circuit might not
center around the Federal Circuit’s true cutpoint, but instead around a
“heightened” cutpoint that reflects the presumption of validity. This is because
litigants would anticipate the Federal Circuit’s demand for a higher showing of
invalidity when choosing which cases to appeal. If most of the patents that
arrive at the Federal Circuit in litigation are boundary-pushing patents, then
the Federal Circuit will have more opportunities to expand the law than to
contract it. The result might well be patent inflation.51
This is a clever and creative theory, and one based around the mechanisms
and arguments described in Patent Inflation. Accordingly, it is important to
note that it does not conflict in the least with the theory proposed in that article
and might very well complement it.52 Indeed, the fact that Ouellette has

50.
51.
52.

Id. at 515 (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 241 (1998)).
See Ouellette, supra note 2, at 368-69.
Patent Inflation actually suggests a similar—though hardly identical—inflationary effect
stemming from the presumption that granted patents are valid. There, I observed that the
presumption of validity could make the Federal Circuit both more likely to uphold a
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proposed this idea implicitly indicates that she accepts many of the arguments
set forth there. Inflation via asymmetry in PTO appeals and inflation via the
presumption of validity could coexist happily.
Creative as Ouellette’s theory is, however, there are two reasons to doubt
its accuracy. The first is simply that it is always dangerous to rely too strongly
on distinctions between various standards of review. There is little evidence
that courts actually treat these standards differently, particularly appellate
courts dealing with questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact,53 such
as the Federal Circuit in cases of patent validity. It is entirely possible that the
Federal Circuit simply treats the clear and convincing evidence standard as if it
meant “by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Second, and relatedly, Ouellette’s theory relies on a type of mental dualism
on the part of the Federal Circuit. On the one hand, the Federal Circuit must
abide by the clear and convincing evidence standard and decide patent validity
questions on that basis. This is what causes litigants to shift their appeals
decisions until they are appealing primarily boundary-shifting patents. Then,
the Federal Circuit must somehow “forget” that it was applying a clear and
convincing evidence standard and treat its own precedents regarding
presumptively valid patents as if they were de novo adjudications of those
patents on the merits. Consider the alternative: the Federal Circuit upholds a
boundary-pushing patent as valid in the course of litigation based on the clear
and convincing evidence standard. Another patent applicant then files for a
similar patent, is rejected by the PTO, and appeals. If the Federal Circuit took
the clear and convincing evidence standard seriously, it would inform this
unlucky applicant that its prior precedent is not binding, as that precedent was
created under a clear and convincing evidence standard. This would dampen or
even eliminate the process of patent inflation those decisions might otherwise
further.
It seems quite unlikely that the Federal Circuit is both having its cake and
eating it too in this fashion. Instead, the far likelier scenario is that the Circuit
simply pays lip service to the clear and convincing evidence standard without
affording it any substantive impact. The evidence for this is the fact that the
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questionable patent and less likely to overturn one that should be valid under governing
law. See Masur, supra note 3, at 516 n.177. As a result, infringement lawsuits might
themselves generate slight inflationary effects. This differs in important ways from
Ouellette’s argument, as subsequent paragraphs will describe, but it illustrates the extent to
which her proposal is compatible with the theory set forth in Patent Inflation.
See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 233, 236 (2009) (collecting data on over 8000 state court cases from
California and Texas that “illustrate how appellate judges sometimes disregard or
manipulate the various standards of review”).

inflation indicators

Federal Circuit appears to cite infringement appeals when deciding direct PTO
appeals, and direct PTO appeals when deciding infringement appeals, without
remarking upon the distinction.54 So far as one can tell, the court treats these
cases—and the precedents they create—as effectively identical. Nonetheless,
Ouellette’s idea is intriguing and may be worthy of further study.
conclusion
I wish to thank Professor Arti Rai and Lisa Ouellette for their interesting
and thoughtful responses. Patent Inflation offered a description of how the PTO
would be expected to behave, along with a series of specific predictions relating
to the development of the law in light of the agency’s asymmetric relationship
with the Federal Circuit. Reality is never as precise as theory, and the
complexities created by multiple institutional actors comprising thousands of
individuals could conceivably obscure the greater trends at work. But to an
overwhelming extent, Rai and Ouellette’s findings confirm the theory
presented in Patent Inflation. Their work thus stands as an important
contribution to this ongoing project, as well as a validation of it.
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54.

For example, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011), is an infringement lawsuit in which the
Federal Circuit cites In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989), and In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943
(Fed. Cir. 2008), both direct PTO appeals. Meanwhile, In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), is a direct PTO appeal that cites Medical Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v.
Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003), Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group., Inc., 523 F.3d
1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Communications, Inc., 504
F.3d 1236, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2007), all infringement lawsuits. Ouellette provides evidence to
support this contention as well. See Ouellette, supra note 2, at 369-70 nn.120-22.
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